Financial Implosion

Anyone who has read my blog for several years will have seen that I've covered the financial markets regularly and based on a socialist analysis of the finanicalized capitalists system, was able to provide arguments for what we now see unfolding.

John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff have written an excellent summary in the current issue of the Monthly Review. I've included an excerpt below and encourage all to visit the link and read the whole article.

Again, if you have any money in a retirement account and have the ability to choose your investment plan, you should seriously consider putting it in something as close to cash as possible, such as a money market fund, TIPS fund or REIT fund. Bond funds are risky but better than equities. Real estate is also a huge risk.

Good luck and Merry Christmas! Remember, Jesus was the original Communist, or so I've heard. Throw the moneychangers out of the temple! :)

Financial Implosion and Stagnation
Back To The Real Economy

But, you may ask, won’t the powers that be step into the breach again and abort the crisis before it gets a chance to run its course? Yes, certainly. That, by now, is standard operating procedure, and it cannot be excluded that it will succeed in the same ambiguous sense that it did after the 1987 stock market crash. If so, we will have the whole process to go through again on a more elevated and more precarious level. But sooner or later, next time or further down the road, it will not succeed… We will then be in a new situation as unprecedented as the conditions from which it will have emerged.
—Harry Magdoff and Paul Sweezy (1988) 1

“The first rule of central banking,” economist James K. Galbraith wrote recently, is that “when the ship starts to sink, central bankers must bail like hell.”2 In response to a financial crisis of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve and other central banks, backed by their treasury departments, have been “bailing like hell” for more than a year. Beginning in July 2007 when the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds that had speculated heavily in mortgage-backed securities signaled the onset of a major credit crunch, the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Treasury Department have pulled out all the stops as finance has imploded. They have flooded the financial sector with hundreds of billions of dollars and have promised to pour in trillions more if necessary—operating on a scale and with an array of tools that is unprecedented.

In an act of high drama, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson appeared before Congress on the evening of September 18, 2008, during which the stunned lawmakers were told, in the words of Senator Christopher Dodd, “that we’re literally days away from a complete meltdown of our financial system, with all the implications here at home and globally.” This was immediately followed by Paulson’s presentation of an emergency plan for a $700 billion bailout of the financial structure, in which government funds would be used to buy up virtually worthless mortgage-backed securities (referred to as “toxic waste”) held by financial institutions. 3

The outburst of grassroots anger and dissent, following the Treasury secretary’s proposal, led to an unexpected revolt in the U.S. House of Representatives, which voted down the bailout plan. Nevertheless, within a few days Paulson’s original plan (with some additions intended to provide political cover for representatives changing their votes) made its way through Congress. However, once the bailout plan passed financial panic spread globally with stocks plummeting in every part of the world—as traders grasped the seriousness of the crisis. The Federal Reserve responded by literally deluging the economy with money, issuing a statement that it was ready to be the buyer of last resort for the entire commercial paper market (short-term debt issued by corporations), potentially to the tune of $1.3 trillion.

Yet, despite the attempt to pour money into the system to effect the resumption of the most basic operations of credit, the economy found itself in liquidity trap territory, resulting in a hoarding of cash and a cessation of inter-bank loans as too risky for the banks compared to just holding money. A liquidity trap threatens when nominal interest rates fall close to zero. The usual monetary tool of lowering interest rates loses its effectiveness because of the inability to push interest rates below zero. In this situation the economy is beset by a sharp increase in what Keynes called the “propensity to hoard” cash or cash-like assets such as Treasury securities.

Fear for the future given what was happening in the deepening crisis meant that banks and other market participants sought the safety of cash, so whatever the Fed pumped in failed to stimulate lending. The drive to liquidity, partly reflected in purchases of Treasuries, pushed the interest rate on Treasuries down to a fraction of 1 percent, i.e., deeper into liquidity trap territory. 4

Facing what Business Week called a “financial ice age,” as lending ceased, the financial authorities in the United States and Britain, followed by the G-7 powers as a whole, announced that they would buy ownership shares in the major banks, in order to inject capital directly, recapitalizing the banks—a kind of partial nationalization. Meanwhile, they expanded deposit insurance. In the United States the government offered to guarantee $1.5 trillion in new senior debt issued by banks. “All told,” as the New York Times stated on October 15, 2008, only a month after the Lehman Brothers collapse that set off the banking crisis, “the potential cost to the government of the latest bailout package comes to $2.25 trillion, triple the size of the original $700 billion rescue package, which centered on buying distressed assets from banks.”5 But only a few days later the same paper ratcheted up its estimates of the potential costs of the bailouts overall, declaring: “In theory, the funds committed for everything from the bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and those of Wall Street firm Bear Stearns and the insurer American International Group, to the financial rescue package approved by Congress, to providing guarantees to backstop selected financial markets [such as commercial paper] is a very big number indeed: an estimated $5.1 trillion.”6

Despite all of this, the financial implosion has continued to widen and deepen, while sharp contractions in the “real economy” are everywhere to be seen. The major U.S. automakers are experiencing serious economic shortfalls, even after Washington agreed in September 2008 to provide the industry with $25 billion in low interest loans. Single-family home construction has fallen to a twenty-six-year low. Consumption is expected to experience record declines. Jobs are rapidly vanishing. 7 Given the severity of the financial and economic shock, there are now widespread fears among those at the center of corporate power that the financial implosion, even if stabilized enough to permit the orderly unwinding and settlement of the multiple insolvencies, will lead to a deep and lasting stagnation, such as hit Japan in the 1990s, or even a new Great Depression.

24-Dec-2008. Foster, John Bellamy. Financial Implosion and Stagnation. Monthly Review.

The Great Unwind has begun

Note the word "begun." For all the talk of bulls and bears, when you get warnings like this from the biggest bank in the world, you can bet your life that the market has not bottomed, no matter what CNNfn and the host of TV idiots have to say about it.

If you are lucky enough to actually have a retirement account I have one word for you: TIPS. In other words, move your savings into an inflation-linked bond vehicle.

In an article characterized by Marketwatch as a "death-bed confession", Citibank warns on coming recession and massive shakeups in the financial world:

As markets and economies de-leverage across the globe, investors should avoid companies and countries that have grown to rely too much on borrowed money, they said.

That means favoring public-equity markets over hedge funds, private-equity and real estate, while leaning toward emerging market countries and away from developed nations like the U.S., the bank's global equity strategy team advised.

Within equity markets, the financial-services should be avoided because it's still over-leveraged, while other companies have stronger balance sheets, the strategists said.

"Steady growth, low inflation and rock-bottom interest rates encouraged economic and financial participants across the world economy to gear up over the past few years," Robert Buckland and his colleagues on Citi's global strategy team wrote in a note to clients. "Easy money encouraged many to buy a bigger house, a bigger car or a bigger speculative position."

"But now, any behavior that relied upon continued access to easy money is being dramatically reassessed," they added. "Leveraged banks must lend less, leveraged consumers must consume less, leveraged companies must acquire or invest less, and leveraged speculators must speculate less."

Financial-services companies are the most vulnerable to this reduction of borrowed money across the globe, they said.

During the last credit crisis in 1998, European banks were leveraged 26 to 1. In the early part of this decade, leverage grew to 32 to 1. Now the sector is geared 40 to 1 on average, according to Citi's European bank research team.

"The banks have a long way to go," the strategists said. "We would continue to avoid the sector while they are de-leveraging."

Other companies are in much better shape, having rebuilt cash from strong earnings since 2003. Emerging market companies have developed particularly strong balance sheets, having learnt hard lessons from the Asian financial crisis a decade ago.

However, even though some companies may not have much debt themselves, they may be exposed to over-leveraged customers or highly leveraged investors, Citigroup warned.

Automakers, home builders and electronics retailers benefited as customers borrowed money cheaply in recent years to buy cars, houses and flat-screen TVs. That attractive financing is now being withdrawn.

"There will be plenty of companies that have strong balance sheets, so may not be most immediately vulnerable to the credit crunch," Citi said. "But they may find that their leveraged customers are vulnerable."

The difference, or spread, between interest rates on investment-grade corporate bonds and Treasury bonds has jumped in recent months, even though most companies aren't very leveraged.

This widening may be caused by leveraged investors such as hedge funds having to sell good quality assets to meet margin calls, or requests for more cash or collateral.

"It is the leverage of the investors who hold these bonds that is now being brutally exposed," Matt King, a Citigroup credit strategist, said.

"We are now confronted by a broad bloodbath in the credit markets," Citigroup said. " The most leveraged paper is falling in value because it is leveraged, and now the least leveraged paper is also falling in value because it is owned by leveraged investors."

Investors should also avoid hedge funds themselves, along with private equity, Citi added. Both types of investment rely at least partly on borrowed money to generate returns.

"Private equity returns have been especially strong. Without leverage it will be much harder to meet excessive investor expectations [most surveys suggest 20% annual returns are expected from the asset class]," Citi warned. "Similarly, many hedge funds have generated healthy uncorrelated returns by adopting cautious underlying strategies, but applying significant leverage. Again, that looks unsustainable in the current environment."

Leveraged economies, like the U.S., should also be avoided, in favor of emerging market countries, which have reduced borrowing, the bank advised.

With less capital sloshing around the world, and the dollar falling, the U.S. may have to compete more to finance its deficits.

"The U.S. shows up as the world's greatest consumer of external capital," Citi noted. So it "has the most to lose as this capital becomes less freely available."

IMF Warns of Serious Crisis

Kevin Depew of Minyanville, quoting from the Financial Times, today offers:

1. IMF Warns of "Serious Crisis"

Rodrigo Rato, outgoing managing director of the International Monetary Fund, warned that the credit squeeze was a “serious crisis” that was not over yet and would curtail growth worldwide, the Financial Times reported.

• “Policymakers should not think that the problems will stay at the desk of the bankers,” Rato told the FT.
• “Problems are going to come to the real sector, come to the budgets – that is something we keep telling people.”
• The outgoing IMF chief said many of the big emerging markets are growing rapidly, but “to what extent they will keep that momentum will depend on how long the slowdown is in the US and Europe."
• Wait a minute, did we say, "outgoing" IMF director?
• Indeed we did, which admittedly takes some of the sting out of Rato's warnings.
• It's a bit like when you take a new job, get drunk at your celebratory party, and blab to everyone about how your old firm is horrible and will probably collapse into bankruptcy without your genius to rely on anymore.

2. But Wait, There's More

Outgoing IMF Director Rodrigo Rato also told the Financial Times the U.S. dollar is now “undervalued” on many measures, a statement which the FT gushed is "an unusually bold assessment."

• Is it? Is it really an "unusually bold assessment"?
• We're not so sure.
• First, the U.S. dollar index is down more than 2% in the past 30 days alone, and down nearly 6.5% year-to-date.
• Over the past 18 months it's down 14%.
• And now we're seeing the inevitable stories rushing to embrace the decline as positive for business.
• Bloomberg boasts "Weak Dollar Boosts Growth Without Fueling Inflation."
• "The dollar is in a quasi-sweet spot,'' Joseph Quinlan, chief market strategist at Bank of America (BAC), told Bloomberg.
• "It's dropped enough that it's creating an earnings upside for U.S. multinationals, while I expect many foreign companies to hold the line on prices they charge U.S. consumers.''
• Too bad those those are two different and unrelated things: earnings upside for multinationals, and domestic pricing power.
  

Meanwhile, I'm reading Sweezy & Magdoff's "The Irreversible Crisis" (Monthly Review Press). They offer an incredibly compelling framework for understanding exactly what the heck is going on in the world economy. Best 10-bucks you'll ever spend, irregardless of your politics.

Productivity and the Crisis of Capital

It is truly telling when even capitalist wonks are making the same critiques (with some of the same conclusions) of the financialization of capital as Marxists have been all along. The fellows at Minyanville fall into that category and have these interesting posts over the past two days:

Kevin Depew:

Eric Weiner in an article published in Tuesday's LA Times (Use time wisely -- by slacking off) writes, "Attitudes toward work differ not only across time but also place. Corinne Maier's appropriately slim volume, "Bonjour Laziness: Why Hard Work Doesn't Pay," advocated that workers resort to "active disengagement" at the office. It was a bestseller in France but didn't resonate on these shores."

• Yes, when it was published a year ago, Maier's book advocating laziness didn't resonate on these shores.
• But that is already changing.
• Weiner writes in the Times:
  "In his essay, "In Praise of Idleness," British philosopher Bertrand Russell proposed reducing the workday to four hours, convinced that "the road to happiness and prosperity lies in an organized diminution of work." I agree. So be creative, be happy and waste some more time. Read this article again and again. Try reading it backward. E-mail it to co-workers. Translate it into Mandarin, then back into English. Then grab a coffee and enjoy some down time."
• What is the connection with financial markets?
• Think back for a moment to the Greenspan Productivity Miracle.
• Well, the former Fed Chairman was certainly right about that.
• The U.N.'s International Labor Organization recently issued a report that found that the U.S. leads the world in worker productivity -- and by a wide margin, Weiner notes.
• So why would it change?
• Productivity, like most "financial virtues," is the products of positive social mood trends.
• As social mood transitions to negative, we can expect to see less and less "virtue" in hard work.
• Think about it: real wages are virtually stagnant, so it's not as if people have experienced real reward for their work.
• What has been experienced is an unconscious and shared herding impulse trending upward; a shared optimistic mood finding "joy" and "happiness" in work and denigrating the sole pursuit of leisure, idleness.
• If social mood has, in fact, peaked, we can expect to see a different attitude toward work and productivity emerge.
• Note that Weiner's article doesn't simply value leisure - it values "slacking off."
• The phrase itself carries negative connotations:
• Slacking - loosening, becoming less tight, less taut
• Off - disengaging, dropping, deflating
• These are not accidental connotations.
• Within a positive social mood regime this might instead be called "pursuit of leisure."

13-Sep-2007: Minyanville, Five Things You Need to Know

And later:

Prof. Depew,

I think you've hit on one of the major causes of the productivity backpedaling when you point out that workers have long been receiving deteriorating real compensation. I think that as credit dries up, they will be left to face the impact of this lack of real income growth. Credit has simply masked that impact for years (indeed, the deteriorating real incomes have probably spurred the very same runaway consumer credit growth).

But I think there is another side to the drop in productivity, which I also expect to continue in force: the business world in general seems to have forgotten how to create progress at its financial core (wisely financing innovation). If too much malinvestment predominates, then you have entire enterprises of people running around to no profitable end, regardless of how "hard" they work. Ultimately, the debt tied to malinvestment does not get paid back, at which point it effectively subtracts from the GDP, and shows up as lower bulk productivity in the economy.

In a series of mass economic bubbles, such as those which have come to dominate the U.S. economy, you have a rolling pool of malinvestment, which remains even if the current bubble changes. The bubble sucks millions of people into fictitious bubble jobs, all of which are essentially malinvestment. Just think of the hundreds of thousands of pointless and unnecessary jobs and trillions of dollars of fictitious wealth created in the housing finance bubble (ignoring the companion home building bubble).

I would place the number of such jobs in our economy at at least 5 mln, including the housing bubble, the (overpriced) health care bubble, and the Homeland Security bubble. That's a lot of productivity decline baked into the cake...

14-Sep-2007: Minyanville, Malinvestment Behind the Return of the Slacker

Pretty amazing stuff. Of course, these guys are very faithful to their religion, and believe strongly that allowing the "free-market" to work without interference from central banks (such as the Federal Reserve) or from the governments would solve all the ills of the world. They believe that the crisis is an exception to the rule, rather than the rule itself.

This is plain wrong. The financialization of capital is a natural outcome, predicted by Marx, of the capitalist system rooted in the M-M¹ circuit of money capital.

So we have:

The monetary crisis referred to in the text, being a phase of every crisis, must be clearly distinguished from that particular form of crisis, which also is called a monetary crisis, but which may be produced by itself as an independent phenomenon in such a way as to react only indirectly on industry and commerce. The pivot of these crises is to be found in moneyed capital, and their sphere of direct action is therefore the sphere of that capital, viz., banking, the stock exchange, and finance.

Capital Vol. I, Ch. 3, Karl Marx, 1967

and:

It is to finance-capital that the capitalist future belongs. But this, both in the international struggle of competition and in the internal class struggle, means the most brutal and violent form of capital.

Finance-Capital and Crises, Karl Kautsky, 1911

The best solution is to overturn the system itself and replace it with a socialist system based on the logic of human need, as opposed to the exploitive capitalist system which is only interested in profit.

Subprime Plot Thickens

I found out about Minyanville today, a website by investing guru Todd Harrison. He is hardly a progressive, but he writes with candour and wit, both rare commodities in the financial journals.

Part of a recent article of his is posted below; in it he covers the past few months of financial machinations connecting the dots and it is is well worth the read.

If you have any retirement whatsoever, READ IT.

As for me, I'm moving everything into cash and bonds (see Strategies for a Bear Market) until things shake out. It seems very clear that this going to be much worse than the dot.com bubble burst.

David Walker, the U.S. comptroller general, proclaimed that the U.S government was on a "burning platform of unsustainable policies with fiscal deficits, chronic health-care underfunding" and "chilling long-term stimulations" as he mapped the parallels between modern-day society and the fall of the Roman Empire.

These are not my words. They come from a nonpartisan figure in charge of the Government Accountability Office, which is often described as the investigative arm of the U.S. Congress.

"I'm trying to sound an alarm and issue a wakeup call," he said in the midst of his 15-year term, which began during the Clinton administration. "The U.S is on a path toward an explosion of debt."

Excerpt of the article by Todd Harrison:

NEW YORK -- They say that if you're playing poker and don't know who the sucker is, chances are it's you. For those currently holding trading cards, the stakes have never been higher.

Over the past few weeks, as risk chips stacked around the table, investors have been forced to call the bluffs of some of the savviest players in the global game.

The winners will walk away with a royal flush of profits, smiling all the way to the casino pool. The losers? They'll self-loathe and second-guess themselves on the hitchhike home, hungry for redemption and wanting for more.

Let's review the series of seemingly inconsistent hands we've been dealt during what was supposed to be a quiet stretch on the summer deck.

At the beginning of the summer, when "collateralized debt obligations" and "subprime mortgages" were first introduced into the mainstream vernacular, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson was quick to assure us that the problems were "contained."

To be fair, Mr. Paulson wasn't alone. In fact, he was in very good company. See Minyanville article. San Francisco Fed President Janet Yellen, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher and Federal Reserve Governor Fredric Mishkin were unanimous in their assuring voices that we had nothing to fear but fear itself.

Fast forward a few months. That's when things really started getting strange.

[...]

Two days after the FOMC meeting, BNP Paribas, France's largest bank, halted withdrawals from three funds because it couldn't fairly value holdings tied to the stateside subprime mess.

IKB Deutsche Bundesbank confirmed that it was holding special meetings to discuss
its "financial situation."

The U.K. issued a statement that its subprime crisis might be worse than the one in the U.S.

Those concerns, on the margin, were disconcerting. But as actions speak louder than words, the sequence of events that followed offered a more telling view that strange things were afoot at the Circle-K.

The European Central Bank, in an "unprecedented response to a sudden demand for cash," injected $130 billion into the financial machination. The U.S., Japan and Australia also stepped up to the plate with piles of dough, upping the ante to more than $300 billion.

Even Canada -- Canada! -- chimed in to "assure financial-market participants that it will provide liquidity to support the stability of the Canadian financial system and
the continued functioning of the financial markets."

MarketWatch: If the wheels fall of the financial wagon, you were warned

Real-Estate Meltdown, Just the Beginning?

Yesterday I posted on the mortgage crisis and the effect on the credit market and homeowners. The other side of the finance equation is of course real estate values. Today the Wall Street Journal reported that real-estate mutual funds (or 'REITs' in the finance world parlance) are posting huge losses with no end in sight.

From a Wall Street Journal article by Tom Lauricella:

Mutual funds specializing in real estate are getting clobbered, hit by a one-two punch of woes in the property markets and the tumult in the debt markets.

Although real-estate stocks staged a late rally yesterday, their recent troubles were highlighted this week by a 31% one-day drop in the stock of KKR Financial Holdings LLC Wednesday, a real-estate investment trust, after the company reported financing problems.

The result is that after seven years of spectacular gains, funds investing in real-estate investment trusts are posting huge losses -- some with losses topping 15% over just the past month. That is particularly bad news for investors who poured nearly $18 billion into these funds in the past year and a half.

Meeting Redemptions

As some investors sell, fund managers are forced to sell holdings to meet those redemptions.

The average real-estate fund investing primarily in the U.S. has lost 17.2% over the past three months and is down 16.5% so far this year, according to Morningstar Inc. In contrast, the average diversified U.S. stock fund is up 0.7% so far this year and down 5.9% over the past three months.

[...]

The average global real estate fund -- which will invest both in and outside the U.S. -- has shed 15.2% over the past three months and is down 10.3% since the start of 2007.

Wall Street Journal: Real-Estate Funds Are Hit Hard

Lets face it folks, we are at the beginning of a serious crisis in capital. Where will the bailout come from this time?

The end of the 90s saw the 'dot com' bubble burst which affected millions but was relatively isolated to a specific sector (information technology) and confined to specific urban markets, such as San Fransisco. This was a stage in the increasing finanicialization of capital.

Now capital needed a new outlet for reinvestment and real-estate provided the perfect opportunity. Combined with the massive boost given by investments in the war sector, the real-estate boom provided the much needed new outlet for capital investment.

It was clear from the outset, however, that with real wages decreasing and job growth static, that the real-estate investment strategy required cheap credit and lots of it. This, as we have seen, has been achieved through a combination of extremely low interest rates with increasingly aggressive (until recently) lending practices.

The current crisis is huge. Nearly every financial institution will be affected. Nearly every country will be affected. Consumer demand will be affected on a global scale. Real estate prices will deflate on a global scale.

It seems increasingly likely this very irresponsible and unsustainable run-up will lead to a global depression with dire consequences for all.

The financial capital sector must be reigned in. A socialist program for managing and regulating the financial sector is the only way to prevent such irresponsible behavior and prevent the cyclical boom and bust pattern that is inherent to capitalism, and which has (as we have seen) and will continue to, become increasingly painful with each subsequent cycle.